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1IMMINENCE IN REFUGEE AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A MISPLACED 
NOTION FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
Adrienne Anderson,∗ Michelle Foster,♦ Hélène Lambert,§ and Jane McAdam°
Abstract This article is the first scholarly output of a major research project 
examining the notion of imminence in the law on international protection. It is 
the first piece of scholarship to identify an emerging trend, namely the 
introduction of imminence—whether invoked implicitly or explicitly—as a 
potential barrier to refugee status or complementary protection. The article 
analyses the jurisprudence of relevant international bodies and courts and 
critiques the validity of this notion as a tool for assessing States’ protection 
obligations.
Keywords: Imminence, refugee law, human rights law, complementary protection, non-
refoulement, time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Time is everywhere in refugee and human rights law.1 But in assessing whether someone 
faces a real chance of being persecuted or subjected to other serious harm if removed, the 
immediacy or ‘imminence’ of that harm should not be the basis on which protection is 
granted or denied.2 A decision-maker who took such an approach would fall into legal error.3 
We were struck, however, by several types of protection cases in which the nearness 
in time of harm seemed to play a role, such as those relating to the (future) impacts of climate 
change and to deterioration of health over time. We were curious about why, and how, the 
‘imminence’ of harm was factored into decision-making in this context—either implicitly or 
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 B Burson, ‘The Concept of Time and the Assessment of Risk in Refugee Status Determination’ (Kaldor Centre 
Annual Conference, Sydney, 18 November 2016) 1-2, 4
<http://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/B_Burson_2016_Kaldor_Centre_Annual_Conference.
pdf> (writing in his personal capacity).
2
 By ‘protection’ or ‘international protection’, we mean the protection granted to refugees and others at risk of 
serious harm, based on the principle of non-refoulement in refugee and human rights law (refugee status and 
complementary protection, respectively).
3
 By ‘decision-maker’, we mean refugee and immigration decision-makers (typically immigration officials), 
tribunal members, and judges who consider international protection claims.
2explicitly. What was common to these cases was that the alleged harm was not felt acutely 
now, but, it was argued, it would have deleterious consequences in the future.
Decision-makers may have imported the notion of imminence, understood in terms of 
time (when harm may occur), from other areas of international law, such as the law of self-
defence.4 Yet, even in that context, there is ‘little scholarly consensus on what is properly 
meant by “imminence” in the context of contemporary threats.’5 Indeed, we were surprised 
by how little jurisprudential discussion there has been of the notion, finding that it has instead 
been promoted through academic debate rather than legal instruments or case law. In the 
‘protection of civilians’/peacekeeping context, where the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council has traditionally directed peacekeepers to protect civilians from ‘imminent threat of 
physical violence’6—by ‘us[ing] force to protect civilians who were on the brink of being 
harmed’7—the notion has again proven to be problematic and poorly understood,8 at times 
creating confusion about when to act. For this reason, ‘imminence’ is now rarely invoked in 
that context.9  Our concern is that an already unclear notion may be unwittingly transposed 
into the law on international protection, resulting in poor decision-making, legal error, and, 
ultimately, negative outcomes for refugees and others in need of protection. 
4
 An imminent threat of attack may justify the use of self-defence by a State: Mr Barker to Mr Woodbury—
(Extract), H Ex Doc No 74, 25th Cong, 2nd sess, better known as the Caroline case. The nearness in time of the 
attack seems to demand something ‘instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of 
deliberation’: remarks by the United States Secretary of State on the conditions under which a plea of self-
defence could be accepted (in relation to the Caroline incident), cited in AC Arend, ‘International Law and the 
Preemptive Use of Military Force’ (2003) 26(3) Washington University Law Quarterly 89, 90–1. See also J 




 D Bethlehem, ‘Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors’ (2012) 106 
American Journal of International Law 770, 773. Akande and Liefländer agree that due to the lack of scholarly 
consensus, the notion of imminence ‘needs to be further refined and developed’: D Akande and T Liefländer, 
‘Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and Proportionality in the Law of Self-Defense’ (2013) 103 American 
Journal of International Law 563, 564.
6
 First used October 1999 in UN Security Council (UNSC) Res 1270 (22 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1270 
para 14. See H Willmot et al (eds), Protection of Civilians (OUP 2016).
7
 Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: 
Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges (United Nations 2009) 40 (emphasis added, fn omitted).
8
 ibid 166, 307, 327.
9
 The term ‘imminent’ has been removed, for example, from the mandates of UN missions in Sudan (UNMIS), 
Darfur (UNAMID), Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). See UNSC Res 1706 (31 August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1706 para 12(a); 
UNSC Res 1769 (31 July 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1769 para 15(a)(ii); UNSC Res 2149 (10 April 2014) UN Doc 
S/RES/2149 para 30(a)(i); UNSC Res 2162 (25 June 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2162 para 19(a)(i); UNSC Res 2147 
(28 March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2147 para 4(a)(i) as cited in Scott Sheeran and Catherine Kent, ‘Protection of 
Civilians, Responsibility to Protect, and Humanitarian Intervention Conceptual and Normative Interactions’ in 
Willmot et al (n 6) 45, n 138. Moreover, where it is still invoked, the term ‘imminent’ in this context has been 
more recently defined to encompass more than an immediate timeframe: ‘The protection of civilians [POC] 
mandate often specifies an “imminent” threat of physical violence. A POC threat is considered imminent as 
soon as the mission has a reasonable belief that a potential perpetrator displays a hostile intent, capacity, 
historical record and opportunity to inflict physical violence. The term “imminent” does not therefore imply that 
violence is guaranteed to happen in the immediate or near future or is being carried out. A threat of violence 
against civilians is imminent from the time it is identified until such time that the mission can determine that the 
threat no longer exists’: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, 
‘DPKO/DFS Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping’ 2015.07 (1 April 2015) para 
47; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, ‘Protection of 
Civilians: Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions’ 
2015.02 (February 2015) 25.
3For these reasons, this article engages with issues that go well beyond academic 
inquiry alone: they have immediate and concrete consequences for people whose protection 
claims are rejected because of a lack of legal clarity about the relevance, nature, and scope of 
the notion of imminence. A series of cases in New Zealand has already started to delineate 
the potential of refugee and human rights law to protect people displaced from small Pacific 
Island countries by the impacts of climate change, disasters, and environmental 
degradation.10 While no one has yet been granted protection on these grounds, this 
jurisprudence provides the most comprehensive analysis of the issues to date. ‘Imminence’ 
has been discussed specifically in this context, with the Immigration and Protection Tribunal 
(Tribunal) observing (rightly, in our view) that it imposes no higher threshold than the well-
founded fear test in refugee law, and requires ‘no more than sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds for believing the appellant would be in danger’.11 However, in other 
jurisdictions, imminence has operated inappropriately as an additional hurdle for people 
seeking international protection.12
This article is the first scholarly output of a larger project examining the notion of 
imminence in the protection of refugees and other forced migrants. That project is based on 
the hypothesis that the notion has been introduced haphazardly, and virtually unnoticed, into 
refugee and human rights law, with no legal or conceptual foundation. While at times 
decision-makers’ use of the term may simply be loose language that has no particular import 
in the decision itself, at other times, it is being used to deny protection. Furthermore, there is 
a danger that loose language may risk the notion being used more substantively. 
Beyond its scholarly contribution, we hope that this conceptual article will help to sharpen 
the focus of decision-makers when considering issues of time and risks of harm in protection 
cases, and the implications of using the notion of imminence in deciding whether or not 
individuals require international protection. 
II. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The Refugee Convention remains the ‘cornerstone of the international refugee protection 
regime’.13 However, due to its relatively restrictive definition—which requires a person to 
establish a ‘well-founded fear’ of being persecuted for reasons of his or her race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group—it has been 
supplemented by international and regional human rights law, which has stepped in to fill 
certain gaps by protecting people against return to a ‘real risk’ of (inter alia) being subjected 
10
 *AC (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 800517; AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413; AF (Tuvalu) [2015] NZIPT 
800859; *BG (Fiji) [2012] NZIPT 800091; Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment [2013] NZHC 3125; Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment [2014] NZCA 173; Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment [2015] NZSC 107. Note that an asterisked New Zealand case means that it is a precedent. 
Australian and New Zealand authorities have considered cases on this issue at least as far back as 1995, as 
discussed in J McAdam, ‘The Emerging New Zealand Jurisprudence on Climate Change, Disasters and 
Displacement’ (2015) 3 Migration Studies 131.
11
 AF (Kiribati) (n 10) [90].
12
 See discussion below in Part IV.
13
 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) EXCOM Conclusion No 103 (LVI) ‘Conclusion on the 
Provision on International Protection Including Through Complementary Forms of Protection’ (2005) Preamble.
4to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or being arbitrarily 
deprived of their life (known as complementary protection).14 
This article begins by exploring whether the evidentiary standards relevant to assessing 
claims for international protection, namely ‘well-founded fear’ and ‘real risk’, inherently 
contain an imminence component. It then examines jurisprudence from international and 
supranational courts and bodies assessing claims for international protection in which the 
notion of imminence has formed part of the reasoning, either explicitly or implicitly. The 
jurisdictions examined are the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), the UN Committee 
against Torture (UNCAT), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU).15 They were chosen because: (a) they represent 
decision-making with respect to non-return to a ‘real risk’ of harm (which is directly relevant 
to refugee law and the ‘well-founded fear’ test), drawing on international law and/or 
European Union (EU) law; (b) they invoke the notion of imminence in their decisions, 
whether implicitly or explicitly; and (c) their decisions are publicly accessible, enabling an 
in-depth assessment of relevant decisions from each jurisdiction. 
Each selected jurisdiction has its own treaty framework and distinctiveness. The 
UNHRC, a body of independent experts that monitors States’ implementation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),16 can consider individual 
complaints about alleged violations by States that are parties to its First Optional Protocol.17 
In the present context, the most relevant allegations arise in relation to Articles 6 and 7 of the 
ICCPR, which, respectively, protect the right to life, and the right not to be subjected to 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
The UNCAT, established by Article 17 of the Convention against Torture (CAT),18 
may ‘receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals’ subject to the 
jurisdiction of any State that has made a relevant declaration pursuant to Article 22. For 
present purposes, the relevant provision is Article 3 which provides that ‘[n]o State Party 
shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’
In Europe, Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
respectively protect the right to life, and the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.19 Both have been acknowledged as extending to protect 
individuals from removal to a real risk of such harm20—in other words, they have a non-
refoulement component. This protection may be present in other rights as well: indeed, the 
14
 For an overview, see J McAdam, ‘Human Rights and Forced Migration’ in E Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (OUP 2014); J McAdam, Complementary 
Protection in International Refugee Law (OUP 2007). 
15
 The next element of the project is to examine state practice through case law in Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
16
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171.
17
 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.
18
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 
December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85.
19
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, 
entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS No 5 (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended).
20
 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 paras 91, 113.
5ECtHR has expressly acknowledged this possibility with respect to Article 4 (prohibition of 
slavery and forced labour),21 Article 5 (right to liberty and security),22 Article 6 (right to a fair 
trial),23 Article 7 (no punishment without law),24 Article 8 (right to respect for private and 
family life),25 and Article 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion).26 
However, whereas in a claim based on Articles 2 or 3 an applicant must show that there are 
‘substantial grounds’ for believing that he or she would face a real (‘foreseeable’)27 risk of 
being subjected to the relevant harm,28 a claim based on the other provisions demands a much 
higher standard—a ‘flagrant breach’ or a ‘disproportionate breach’ of a right—which has 
rarely been met.29 In many cases, violations of these other rights will already be encapsulated 
by the prohibition on removal to ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ in Article 3,30 which is 
why such cases are the primary focus in Part IV below.31 
In the EU, the CJEU, through its preliminary reference procedure, answers questions 
referred to it by the national courts of EU Member States seeking clarification of the 
interpretation of EU law.32 The cases pertinent to the present article relate primarily to the 
interpretation of the Qualification Directive,33 which protects third-country nationals 
recognized as refugees34 and beneficiaries of ‘subsidiary protection’.35 The latter are people 
who cannot be removed because there are ‘substantial grounds … for believing’ that they 
‘would face a real risk of suffering serious harm’,36 namely (a) the death penalty or 
execution; (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or (c) a ‘serious and 
individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in 
situations of international or internal armed conflict’.37 A significant difference between EU 
21
 Ould Barar v Sweden (1999) 28 EHRR CD213.
22
 Tomic v United Kingdom, Application No 17837/03, Judgment of 14 October 2003; El-Masri v Macedonia 
(2013) 57 EHRR 25.
23
 Soering (n 20); Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 745; Einhorn v France, 
Application No 71555/01, Judgment of 16 October 2001; Mamatkulov v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 25; Al-
Moayad v Germany (2007) 44 EHRR SE22; Stapleton v Ireland (2010) 51 EHRR SE4; Othman v United 
Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 1.
24
 Gabarri Moreno v Spain (2004) 39 EHRR 40.
25
 F v United Kingdom, Application No 17341/03, Judgment of 22 June 2004.
26
 Z v United Kingdom, Application No 27034/05, Judgment of 28 February 2006.
27
 Soering (n 20) [100].
28
 ibid (extradition); Cruz Varas v Sweden (1991) 14 EHRR 1; Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413; 
Ahmed v Austria (1997) 24 EHRR 278 (expulsion). See E Lauterpacht and D Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and 
Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion’ in E Feller, V Türk and F Nicholson (eds), Refugee 
Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (CUP 2003) paras 
246, 249, 252.
29
 Othman (n 23); El-Masri (n 22); Al Nashiri v Poland, Application No 28761/11, Judgment of 24 July 2014; 
Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland, Application No 7511/13, Judgment of 24 July 2014.
30
 Z (n 26); see also R v Special Adjudicator, ex parte Ullah [2004] 2 AC 323. Multiple rights may, however, be 
breached: see eg El-Masri (n 22).
31
 For an excellent and comprehensive overview of the scope of non-refoulement in the ECHR, see C Costello, 
The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law (OUP 2016).
32
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C115/47, Art 267 
(ex Art 234 TEC).
33
 The European Parliament and the Council Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on Standards for the 
Qualification of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a 
Uniform Status for Refugees or for Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the 
Protection Granted [2011] OJ L 337/9 (Qualification Directive). 
34
 ibid Art 2(d) (which incorporates the definition of a refugee in Art 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, subject 
to restricting its application in this context to third-country nationals) and Arts 9–10.
35
 ibid Art 15.
36
 ibid Art 2(f).
37
 ibid Art 15.
6law and the ECHR is that the grant of refugee status or subsidiary protection status under the 
Qualification Directive results in a specific set of rights and benefits for beneficiaries, of 
which protection against refoulement is just one. The situation is notably different under the 
ECHR, which only provides for protection against refoulement.38
III. TIME AND RISK ASSESSMENT IN INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION CASES
The notion that ‘time’ is relevant to the assessment of international protection is not new; 
rather, it is central to many aspects of both the refugee definition and the broader protection 
regime.39 As Durieux has observed, refugee situations ‘are exceptional circumstances in 
international relations’ and, as such, ‘are necessarily temporary’.40 Indeed, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the body vested with the responsibility to supervise 
the application of the Refugee Convention, was initially established as a temporary entity 
with a three-year mandate, which was subsequently extended in five-year increments until 
2004 when it finally became open-ended.41 The cessation clauses of the Refugee Convention 
envisage that an individual’s need for international protection may be temporary: for 
instance, refugee status may end if the circumstances in the country of origin change 
fundamentally.42 Contemporary debates about temporary protection, accelerated procedures, 
and durable solutions all invoke the concept of time as a central factor in refugee protection. 
In terms of the substantive assessment of who is a refugee, time permeates every 
aspect of the refugee status determination (RSD) process:
On the one hand, time points backwards because refugee claims are grounded in what 
has happened in the past. … RSD, however, also faces forward in time. It reaches into 
the future and inquires as to the predicament of the claimant in his or her country of 
origin. Refugee status is recognised precisely because the future there for the claimant 
is anticipated to be one in which some form of serious harm will accrue to him or her 
at some projected point in time arising from a failure of the state of origin to protect 
the enjoyment of his or her fundamental human rights by reason of a Convention-
protected ground.43
38
 This is also the case under Arts 4 and 19(2) of the European Union (EU) Charter of Fundamental Rights 
which guarantee protection against refoulement but not necessarily a status akin to that under the Qualification 
Directive: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01.
39
 There is also an increasing interest in time in international law more generally: see for example, M Ambrus 
and RA Wessel (eds), Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2014: Between Pragmatism and 
Predictability: Temporariness in International Law (TMC Asser Press 2015) vol 45. In refugee law, see eg J-F 
Durieux and J McAdam, ‘Non-Refoulement Through Time: The Case for a Derogation Clause to the Refugee 
Convention in Mass Influx Emergencies’ (2004) 16 IJRL 4; J-F Durieux, ‘Time in the Refugee Regime’ 
(Keynote address, Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law Annual Conference, 18 
November 2016).
40
 J-F Durieux, ‘Protection Where? – or When? First Asylum, Deflection Policies and the Significance of Time’ 
(2009) 21 IJRL 75, 75.
41
 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Res 58/153, UN Doc A/RES/58/153 (22 December 2003). 
42
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 
UNTS 137, read in conjunction with the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, 
entered into force 4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 267 (together, Refugee Convention) Art 1C; see also Arts 1D, 
1E.
43
 Burson (n 1) 1–2.
7The maxim that assessing a well-founded fear of persecution involves a forward-
looking assessment of risk is well entrenched, yet there is little analysis of how far forward 
the assessment may extend, or what the role of time is in that prospective assessment.  In light 
of the lack of explicit consideration of these issues, we begin our analysis by reflecting on 
whether there is there anything inherent in either the ‘well-founded fear’ or ‘real risk’ tests—
the so-called ‘standard of proof’ in international protection claims—that provides answers to 
these questions.
The well-founded fear test in refugee law clearly entails a prospective and forward-
looking assessment.  Indeed, it has been stated that any refugee determination is necessarily 
an ‘essay in hypothesis, an attempt to prophesy what might happen to the applicant in the 
future, if returned to his or her country of origin’.44 Therefore, a degree of speculation about 
future risk does not preclude a protection need from being recognized.  However, other than 
these broad forms of guidance, it is striking that while there is a significant body of both 
jurisprudence and scholarship analysing a number of contentious aspects of the well-founded 
fear test, comparatively little has been written about the role of time itself.45  Instead, debates 
about the ‘well-founded fear’ test have centred on: (a) whether it entails a subjective notion 
or is entirely objective46; (b) the necessary degree of likelihood to establish that a fear/risk is 
‘well-founded’47; and (c) evidentiary issues, including past persecution and generalized 
violence.48    
It is in relation to the degree of likelihood that one would assume a consideration of 
time would most likely be found. In perhaps the most cited decision on this topic, the United 
States Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca explained that: 
There is simply no room in the United Nations’ definition for concluding that because 
an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, 
that he or she has no ‘well-founded fear’ of the event happening…[A] moderate 
interpretation of the ‘well-founded fear’ standard would indicate ‘that so long as an 
44
 GS Goodwin-Gill and J McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2007) 54. 
45
 Hathaway and Foster refer to the ‘distant future’ (JC Hathaway and M Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (2nd 
edn, CUP 2014) 123); Wouters refers to the ‘near future’ (Kees Wouters, International Legal Standards for the 
Protection from Refoulement (Intersentia 2009) 26). Hathaway and Foster observe that ‘the inquiry should not 
focus just on present risks, but also on such risks as may well eventuate’: 123. Goodwin-Gill and McAdam also 
note that ‘the element of well-foundedness looks more to the future, than to the past’: Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam (n 44) 63; see also 54. Zimmermann and Mahler simply note that ‘the term “fear” expresses a 
forward-looking expectation of risk’: A Zimmermann and C Mahler, ‘Article 1 A, Para 2 1951 Convention’ in 
A Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A 
Commentary (OUP 2011) 341.
46
 Some scholars interpret ‘fear’ as ‘apprehension’ rather than subjective fear: see for example Hathaway and 
Foster (n 45) 105-6 and Gregor Noll, ‘Evidentiary Assessment under the Refugee Convention: Risk, Pain and 
the Intersubjectivity of Fear’ in Gregor Noll (ed) Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in Asylum 
Procedures (Martinus Nijhoff 2005) 152. Whereas the preponderance of scholars (as well as judicial authority) 
takes the view that there is a subjective element to the fear requirement: see for example Goodwin Gill and 
McAdam (n 44) at 63-64 and Zimmermann (n 45) at 174.  For the most comprehensive analysis of the issue, see 
James C Hathaway, ‘Michigan Guidelines on Well-Founded Fear’ (2005) Michigan Journal of International 
Law 492 and the related article, James C Hathaway and William Hicks, ‘Is there a Subjective Element in the 
Refugee Convention's Requirement of 'Well-Founded Fear'? (2005) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 
505.
47
 In this context the key issue in the scholarship has been the relationship between the ‘well-founded fear’ test 
in the Refugee Convention and other tests adopted in international human rights law, see for example, Wouters 
(n 45) at 25-26; 83-85.  See also n 52 below.
48
 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Hathaway and Foster (n 45) at 161-181.
8objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the 
situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a 
reasonable possibility’.49
That the well-founded fear test requires only ‘a reasonable possibility’ of persecution, 
rather than the likelihood of harm, is an approach that has been widely replicated, with a 
variety of interchangeable tests effectively amounting to one of ‘real chance’.50 While 
excluding risks that amount to ‘sheer speculation’, situations where there is only a ‘bare 
possibility’ of harm, or where the risk is ‘so slight that it could be discounted’,51 it is an 
appropriately liberal test that reflects the protective objective of the refugee definition and the 
inherent challenges in establishing a future risk of persecution with any certainty.
Analysis of the ‘well-founded fear’ test has tended not to invoke concepts of 
directness of harm, necessity, or any indication of when a risk needs to eventuate. It is 
possible that a risk becomes more ‘remote’ or speculative, and thus less likely, the further 
into the future it is anticipated, but imminence—in the sense of timing—has not and cannot 
be assumed to constitute an inherent aspect of the well-founded fear test. Rather, that test 
would appear to be sufficiently open-textured to accommodate a longer-frame assessment of 
future risk. It thus appears capable of encompassing the evolving nature of many 
contemporary forms of slower-onset harms which may present less immediate, but no less 
serious, risks to human rights.
How does the well-founded fear test relate to the parallel ‘real risk’ test in the context 
of non-refoulement under human rights law (complementary protection)?  While the Refugee 
Convention itself provides the test for refugee law, namely, a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted, there is no clear test provided in most of the relevant human rights treaties due to 
the fact that the non-refoulement obligations derived from the ICCPR and ECHR are implied 
from other, primary obligations (such as the right not to be subjected to torture). The 
exception is CAT, where Article 3 explicitly provides that no State shall expel or return a 
person to another State ‘where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture’.  
Just as the well-founded fear test has spawned a considerable literature, the real risk 
test has similarly stimulated analysis of matters such as whether there is a subjective or 
purely objective element,52 whether the evidentiary threshold should vary depending on the 
gravity of harm,53 and how precisely the relevant standard of likelihood of harm should be 
49
 Immigration and Naturalization Service v Cardoza-Fonseca 480 US 421 (1987) at 440 per Stevens J.
50
 Hathaway and Foster (n 45) 113.
51
 ibid 114-5. 
52
 For example, McAdam, Complementary Protection (n 14) argues that the ‘substantial grounds’ test in the 
Qualification Directive is ‘an objective one’ by contrast to the Refugee Convention: see at 61-3. By contrast 
Cherubini disagrees that the test as embodied in the Qualification Directive ‘clearly rules out the existence of 
subjective elements’: F Cherubini, Asylum Law in the European Union: From the Geneva Convention to the 
Law of the EU (Taylor and Francis 2014) at 203.
53
 Several scholars argue that the evidentiary threshold should vary depending on the severity of treatment, that 
is, the more severe the consequences, the lower the threshold should be.  The core piece appears to be T 
Einarsen, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the Notion of an Implied Rights to de facto 
Asylum’ (1990) 2 International Journal of Refugee Law 361 at 371.  Several commentators cite this piece as 
authority for that proposition: see for example Goodwin Gill and McAdam (n 44) 314; A Fabbricotti, ‘The 
Concept of Inhuman or Degrading Treatment in International Law and its Application in Asylum Cases’ (1998) 
10 IJRL 637 at 646, and D Weissbrodt and I Hortreiter, ‘The Principle of Non-refoulement: Article 3 of the 
9framed. In relation to the last of these, there has been some debate as to whether the ‘real 
risk’ test represents a higher threshold for applicants than the well-founded fear test,54 
although the better view is that they should be equivalent.55 Insofar as there is a further gloss 
on the meaning of real risk, it is the notion of foreseeability- not imminence- that is most 
often invoked.56  Yet, foreseeability in and of itself does not denote a particular timeframe.
To the extent that there has been any assessment of the role of time in the context of 
the real risk test, it has focused on the need for a forward-looking assessment from the date of 
determination. The ECtHR, for example, is explicit that while historical events may shed 
light on present or future events,57 current circumstances are determinative. Often, but not 
always, this formulation is accompanied by the ECtHR declaring that it makes an ex nunc 
assessment (‘from now on’). For example, in SHH v United Kingdom, it stated:
In order to determine whether there is a real risk of ill-treatment in this case, the Court 
must examine the foreseeable consequences of sending the applicant to Afghanistan, 
bearing in mind the general situation there and his personal circumstances … A full 
and ex nunc assessment is called for as the situation in a country of destination may 
change over the course of time. Even though the historical position is of interest 
insofar as it may shed light on the current situation and its likely evolution, it is the 
present conditions which are decisive and it is therefore necessary to take into account 
information that has come to light since the final decision taken by the domestic 
authorities.58
Thus, an ex nunc test requires that the future risk be assessed at the date of the decision-
maker’s consideration of the case.59 In other words, procedurally it requires an assessment of 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison 
with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of other International Human Rights Treaties (1999) 5 BHRLR 1 at 14.  
54
 For helpful discussion of this issue, see in particular, H Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) paras 277-285; and Costello (n 31) at 178-9.
55
 The UNHCR has stated that ‘there is no basis for adopting a stricter approach to proving risk in cases of 
complementary protection than there is for refugee protection’: UNHCR, ‘Submission to the Migration 
Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2009 Inquiry’ (30 September 2009) para 34, 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=f175865d-d80b-43b6-b845-fda2049ab713>. The 
jurisprudence of the various international supervisory bodies supports the view that it is, at least in theory, the 
same standard as ‘real chance’ in the Refugee Convention.  For a detailed summary of the case-law, see Andrew 
and Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, ‘Submission in relation to the Migration Amendment 




 For example in the seminal Soering decision (n 20), the United Kingdom government had argued that ‘the 
application of Article 3 (art. 3) in extradition cases should be limited to those occasions in which the treatment 
or punishment abroad is certain, imminent and serious’: at para 83.   However, in its reasoning the court 
emphasized foreseeability not certainty as the test: see para 90.
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 The leading case with this formulation is Chahal (n 28). See also Garayev v Azerbaijan, Application No 
53688/08, Judgment of 10 June 2010; AGR v Netherlands, Application No 13442/08, Judgment of 12 January 
2016; AWQ v Netherlands, Application No 25077/06, Judgment of 12 January 2016; MRA v Netherlands, 
Application No 46856/07, Judgment of 12 January 2016. The Court did not use the language of ‘ex nunc’ in 
these cases. 
58
 SHH v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 18 para 72. See also Sheekh v Netherlands (2007) 45 EHRR 50; JK 
v Sweden, Application No 59166/12, Judgment of 23 August 2016; Chankayev v Azerbaijan, Application No 
56688/12, Judgment of 14 November 2013; Tershiyev v Azerbaijan, Application No 10226/13, Judgment of 31 
July 2014; Mawaka v Netherlands, Application No 29031/04, Judgment of 1 June 2010; H v United Kingdom 
(2013) 57 EHRR 17; EG v United Kingdom (2012) 54 EHRR 1.
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 Sheekh (n 58) para 136.
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future risk today, but it should not foreclose the substantive assessment. As the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR recalled in JK and Others v Sweden, the principle of an ex nunc 
evaluation of the circumstances requires that the ‘assessment must focus on the foreseeable 
consequences of the applicant’s removal to the country of destination in the light of the 
general situation there and his or her personal circumstances.’60 The court further explained
that it is assessing the applicants’ situation from the present-day point of view. The 
main question is not how the Swedish immigration authorities assessed the case at the 
time (that is, when the Migration Agency and the Migration Court took their decisions 
on 22 November 2011 and 23 April 2012 respectively) but rather whether, in the 
present-day situation, the applicants would still face a real risk of persecution for the 
above-mentioned reasons if removed to Iraq.61
The CJEU, too, undertakes an ex nunc test. In EU law, the assessment of facts and 
circumstances is regulated by Article 4 of the Qualification Directive. According to the 
CJEU, this
‘assessment’ takes place in two separate stages. The first stage concerns the 
establishment of factual circumstances which may constitute evidence that supports 
the application, while the second stage relates to the legal appraisal of that evidence, 
which entails deciding whether, in the light of the specific facts of a given case, the 
substantive conditions laid down by Articles 9 and 10 or Article 15 of Directive 
2004/83 for the grant of international protection are met.62
More specifically regarding timing, the Qualification Directive provides that the assessment 
of all relevant facts is to be carried out on an individual basis, as ‘at the time of taking a 
decision on the application’.63 This ex nunc assessment of facts and circumstances is further 
enshrined in the Procedures Directive, which requires that ‘Member States shall ensure that 
an effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of 
law, including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs 
pursuant to [the QD (recast)]’.64 
One context in which there is explicit reference to a minimum future period is in 
relation to actors of protection.65 Of particular relevance to the present study is the fact that 
protection from persecution or serious harm under EU law should be ‘effective and of a non-
temporary nature’.66 While there is no finite future period specified, the fact that ‘protection’ 
against persecution or serious harm must be non-temporary and durable strongly points to the 
60JK (n 58) para 83.
61
 ibid para 113.
62
 Case C-277/11 MM v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland, Attorney General (First 
Chamber, 22 November 2012) para 64.
63
 Art 4(3)a. See also UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No 12: Claims for Refugee Status related 
to Situations of Armed Conflict and Violence under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees and the Regional Refugee Definitions’ UN Doc HCR/GIP/16/12 (2 December 
2016) para 24 (Guidelines on International Protection No 12): ‘The 1951 Convention protects those who – at the 
time of the decision – are at risk of persecution in their country of origin, regardless of whether they have 
already suffered persecution’.
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 European Parliament and Council Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on Common Procedures for 
Granting and Withdrawing International Protection [2013] OJ L 180/60 Art 46.
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 Qualification Directive (n 33) Article 7.
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need for a temporal assessment that looks well beyond the present, or immediate, risk of 
harm, and into the future.67
Having thus established that there is no conceptual reason why imminence—in the sense of 
timing—should be used to limit a State’s protection obligations, we now turn to consider how 
some judicial bodies have nonetheless begun to import this notion into the assessment of 
international protection claims.
IV. ‘IMMINENCE’ IN INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND OVERSIGHT BODIES
In examining jurisprudence on imminence in international protection, we focused on 
cases where the notion of imminence was explicitly invoked, or where the court or body used 
the concept of timing of future harm as a relevant factor in the assessment of the protection 
claim.68
The notion of imminence has been referred to and used explicitly in all jursidictions 
examined for this research, and, in particular, has been engaged in some cases to reject a 
claim for international protection.69  For example, in five cases in our study, the ECtHR 
relied on the absence of an imminent risk to reject the application.70  Although it has not been 
invoked as a ground for refusal of protection by the CJEU,71 that court does recognize 
67
 See also the CJEU interpretation of the cessation clause (Qualification Directive (n 33) Art 11 and Refugee 
Convention Art 1C) referring to ‘durable change’ in Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, 
Abdulla v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010] ECR I-01493. 
68
 In the four jurisdictions studied, we identified decisions where imminence was explicitly invoked and where 
the impact of time was particularly significant. We identified 27 cases in relation to UNHCR jurisprudence; 59 
cases in relation to UNCAT; 89 cases in relation to the ECtHR; four relevant cases in relation to the CJEU. It 
may also be noted that the ECtHR also has the ability to suspend expulsion or extradition, pursuant to Rule 39 
of the court, to prevent an ‘imminent risk of irreparable damage’ (Mamatkulov (n 23) para 104). These initial 
decisions are not included in this study as there is no factual assessment of imminence. The ECtHR makes such 
decisions quickly without the full evidence (eg Mamatkulov (n 23); MSS v Belgium and Greece (2011) 53 
EHRR 2) and decisions are not published. Curiously, even though case law indicates that the test for interim 
measures in practice is ‘imminent risk’, the Practice Direction on Interim Measures issued by the President of 
the ECtHR in September 2016 did not refer to this standard, but rather to ‘real risk’: ‘The Court will only issue 
an interim measure against a Member State where, having reviewed all the relevant information, it considers 
that the applicant faces a real risk of serious, irreversible harm if the measure is not applied’; ECtHR, ‘Practice 
Direction – Interim Measures’ (Practice direction issued by the President of the Court in accordance with Rule 
32 of the Rules of Court on 5 March 2003 and amended on 16 October 2009 and on 7 July 2011, September 
2016), 1.
69
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(2006) para 6.3; Minani v Canada, UNCAT, Communication No 331/2007, UN Doc CAT/C/43/D/331/2007 
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considerations of time, seriousness of harm, and likelihood/probability as key elements in the 
interpretation of EU law relating to protection.72
While the number of cases that have invoked the notion in an explicit manner to date 
is small in the context of the overall caseload of these jurisdictions, it is nonetheless 
significant that it has been invoked at all, given that it does not appear to have a solid 
foundation in traditional principles of risk assessment in the law on international protection. 
Similarly, the fact that some decision-makers have expressed scepticism about whether the 
invocation of a standard of ‘real and imminent risk’ (as has been adopted in a line of ECtHR 
authority primarily concerning Dublin transfers) is simply a result of ‘nice differences of 
language’,73 the reality is that it has been used to deny protection—and the danger is that it 
could be adopted in future cases.  This is particularly concerning given the lack of focused 
discussion about why it is used, and whether there is any principled basis for doing so.
Analysis of the case law from our selected jurisdictions reveals that while 
supranational courts and international oversight bodies apply certain general principles (eg 
substantial grounds for believing and real risk), their decisions lack detailed reasoning or 
information about how near or far in time a risk of future harm needs to be, what type of 
evidence is required to substantiate it, and why (when explicitly referred to) ‘imminence’ is 
used as a test at all, given that it is not expressly contained in any of the relevant legal 
frameworks. 
The analysis below identifies the two key contexts in which these challenges are most 
acute. The first is where the notion of imminence has been transplanted from a procedural 
setting (where, arguably, it has an appropriate role to play) to a substantive assessment 
(where, arguably, it does not).  The second concerns protection claims involving a risk of 
harm that may manifest in the medium- or long-term, such as  medical cases where a person’s 
health may decline over a period of time and environmental deterioration linked to the 
impacts of climate change. Such cases inevitably raise policy considerations about the role of 
the receiving State in contributing to/mitigating adverse impacts, and the responsibility of the 
host State to protect people from potential (but perhaps mitigable) harm.
A. Imminence: The Dangers of Transplantation from Procedural to Substantive Issues
The context in which the notion of imminence is most likely to be invoked explicitly is in 
assessing whether an applicant has met procedural requirements related to standing or 
‘victimhood’. This is particularly pronounced in the international and regional adjudicatory 
human rights bodies where a complainant must establish that he or she has standing to bring a 
complaint.74 
2014) (Abdida). For a full list of these cases, see International Association of Refugee Law Judges (European 
Chapter), ‘An Introduction to the Common European Asylum System for Courts and Tribunals – A Judicial 
Analysis’ (European Asylum Support Office 2016) 44-46. It may also be noted that although CJEU judgments 
so far relate to the original Qualification Directive of 2004; these are nevertheless relevant to the interpretation 
of the recast Qualification Directive of 2011, particularly since the provisions relating to persecution and serious 
harm remained unchanged.
72
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For example, Article 1 of the ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol provides that the 
UNHRC can consider complaints from individuals ‘who claim to be victims of a violation by 
that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant’.75 Article 2 further provides that 
‘individuals who claim that any of their rights enumerated in the Covenant have been 
violated and who have exhausted all available domestic remedies may submit a written 
communication to the Committee for consideration.’ Where a complainant does not meet the 
criteria of a ‘victim’, the claim is deemed inadmissible.76
The UNHRC has long taken the view that an individual can only claim to be a victim 
of a violation ‘if he or she is actually affected’.77 In 1993, it introduced a further gloss on this 
test by stating that to be a victim, a person ‘must show either that an act or an omission of a 
State party has already adversely affected his or her enjoyment of such right, or that such an 
effect is imminent’.78 In that case, the UNHRC was not persuaded that, ‘at the relevant period 
of time’, the continuing deployment of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands placed the 
authors—a group of 6,588 concerned Dutch citizens—in the position of ‘victims’.79
The same approach was adopted in the 2006 decision of Aalbersberg v Netherlands, 
which involved a group of 2,085 Dutch citizens who claimed a violation of Article 6 (the 
right to life) by virtue of the Netherlands’ willingness to use nuclear weapons and to 
‘cooperate with such use’.80 The UNHRC framed the question of standing in terms of 
whether ‘the State’s stance on the use of nuclear weapons presented the authors with an 
existing or imminent violation of their right to life’.81 No such case was made out and the 
UNHRC therefore dismissed the claim as inadmissible.82 
The rationale for the use of imminence in relation to standing is manifestly clear: the 
international and regional adjudicatory bodies do not have the power to issue advisory 
opinions or engage in moot adjudications.83 Further, and perhaps more importantly, where a 
person is not currently a ‘victim’ for jurisdictional purposes, it is of course possible that the 
circumstances may change and hence permit a subsequent application to be made once harm 
is, indeed, imminent. This was explicitly acknowledged in an analogous context in H v 
Norway, where the ECtHR struck out the claim but nonetheless reassured the applicant that 
75
 See also ECHR Art 34 and CAT Art 22(1). 
76
 In the context of the ECHR, see Bahaddar v Netherlands (1998) 26 EHRR 278, where the ECtHR found the 
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to Article 3’: at para 47.
77
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9.2; see also EP v Colombia, UNHRC, Communication No 318/1988, UN Doc CCPR/C/39/D/318/1988 (1990) 
para 8.2.
78
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‘should her legal situation in Norway change and a risk of expulsion become imminent, it 
remain[ed] open to her to lodge a new application with the Court’, which could include ‘a 
request for an interim measure’.84
However, while the notion of imminence may be justified in the limited context of 
admissibility, our analysis reveals that there is sometimes a conflation of two conceptually 
distinct issues: the question of standing/victimhood, and the substantive question of the 
human rights violation. In the latter context, assuming that there is an imminent risk of 
removal, extradition, deportation, or expulsion, the assessment of State responsibility—and 
hence of likely future harm—must be undertaken at that moment and cannot be deferred to a 
later time when the evidence is clearer or more compelling. As long as the removal is 
imminent—and thus the person’s standing or ‘victimhood’ is made out—the substantive 
question turns on the likelihood of harm resulting from such removal, and arguably not on 
precisely how soon after removal it may manifest. To conflate these two fundamentally 
different contexts and issues, especially without explanation as to the justification for doing 
so,85 is highly problematic.
For example, just two weeks after its decision in Aalbersberg, the UNHRC conflated 
these separate issues by finding a claim to be inadmissible because, inter alia, the applicant 
had not adduced sufficient evidence in support of his contention that he would be ‘exposed to 
a real and imminent risk of violations of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant if deported to 
Pakistan’.86 Similarly, in another largely contemporaneous decision, the UNHRC found a 
claim to be inadmissible, in part because the complainant had failed to adduce sufficient 
evidence that he would be ‘exposed to a real and imminent risk of violations of articles 6 and 
7 of the Covenant’.87 In these admissibility decisions, the UNHRC apparently applied the 
notion of imminence—from a test for standing—to the substantive consideration of the 
alleged violations. 
Similarly, in Europe, the ECtHR has held that even where all the formal admissibility 
conditions have been met, it ‘may nevertheless declare [an application] inadmissible for 
reasons relating to the examination on the merits’.88 For instance, in a number of decisions 
involving Dublin transfers of asylum seekers from one EU Member State to another, the 
ECtHR has found that it has not been ‘demonstrated’ or ‘established’ that an applicant’s 
‘future prospects if returned …, whether taken from a material, physical or psychological 
perspective, disclose a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship severe enough to fall 
within the scope of Article 3’ of the ECHR.89 In reaching these decisions, the court curiously 
relied on its reasoning in cases such as Ireland v United Kingdom90 and Jalloh v Germany,91 
84
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85
 It may nevertheless be explained by the fact that human rights instruments are essentially concerned with 
protection against refoulement. However, the well-founded fear test in international refugee law requires the 
decision-maker to make an assessment on the predicament of an individual irrespective of whether return to the 
country of nationality or former habitual residence is a viable or imminent option. Indeed, the very wording of 
Art 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention requires the applicant to be ‘unable … to return’ to their country of origin. 
See eg, Refugee Appeal No 74880 [2005] NZRSAA 294, para 70; Refugee Appeal No 73861 [2005] NZRSAA 
228, [78]. See also Hathaway and Foster (n 45) 69, 70.
86
 Khan (n 69) para 5.4.
87
 Singh (n 69) which is actually prior to Aalbersberg but very contemporaneous: see para 6.3.
88
 ECtHR, ‘Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria’ (2014) para 375. This Guide is available for downloading 
at www.echr.coe.int (Case-law – Case-law analysis – Admissibility guide). 
89
 Hussein (n 69) para 78 (emphasis added); Diirshi (n 69) para 139. See also, for the same formulation, AME (n 
69) para 36; JA (n 69) para 32; ATH (n 69) para 41. 
90
 Ireland v United Kingdom [1978] 2 EHRR 25 para 161.
15
neither of which referred to ‘real and imminent risk’.  The rationale for introducing an 
imminence test has not, therefore, been articulated or justified.
B.  Imminence and Slow-Onset Harm: Particular Challenges
The timing of future harm is relevant in a range of factual contexts, but the two areas in 
which the issue is most likely to be raised in contemporary jurisprudence are risks associated 
with deteriorating health on return to the country of origin, and those associated with the 
impacts of climate change in the country of origin.
Returning to the departure point for our inquiry, the key challenge is whether it is 
possible or appropriate to identify a basis on which an international protection application can 
be rejected if the harm feared by the applicant is likely to manifest over the longer-term. Is 
there (and should there be) a principled way of defining the relevant time period in assessing 
risk of future harm?  How would variables such as the potential mitigating impacts of disaster 
risk reduction measures be accommodated within the analysis? As standard refugee cases 
show, context is extremely important and the rules cannot be too prescriptive: the focus is not 
on certainty of harm, but whether there is a real risk of it.92
By way of analogy, in situations relating to generalized violence, decision-makers 
must carry out a detailed analysis of all possible factors and consequences, including 
potential risk-mitigating factors and their attendant effects. As UNHCR’s Guidelines on 
International Protection No 12 (UNHCR’s Guidelines) relating to situations of armed conflict 
and violence note:
When assessing the risk, it is important to take into account the fluctuating character of 
many contemporary situations of armed conflict and violence. … For example, even if the 
level of violence at the time of decision-making is relatively low, over time the situation 
of armed conflict and violence may change, increasing the degree of risk establishing a 
well-founded fear. … Similarly, even if violence has not yet broken out in a particular 
part of the country, it may be foreseeable that the violence will spread there, taking into 
account the overall context and history of the situation of armed conflict and violence, the 
trajectory and mapping of the violence, the power dynamics at play and other conditions 
in the applicant’s country of origin. The effects of past violence may also still rise to the 
level of persecution, despite a temporary suspension of hostilities, and need to be assessed 
carefully. In addition, the implementation of peace and demobilization agreements may 
lead to new armed actors filling vacuums of power, or to the consolidation of groups 
composed of former members who have not disarmed and reintegrated into society. This 
also requires a detailed analysis that constantly evolves in response to local developments 
in the country of origin.93
91
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Furthermore, the ‘long-term consequences’ of armed conflict or violence, ‘such as demolition 
of vital infrastructure, insecurity and abject poverty’,94 can amount to persecution or serious 
harm, while 
[t]he systematic denial of food and medical supplies, the cutting of water supplies and 
electricity, the destruction of property or the militarization or closure of hospitals and 
schools may also constitute serious human rights or IHL violations that affect whole 
communities.95 
UNHCR’s Guidelines are very useful in highlighting multi-causal movements, the 
unpredictable nature of armed conflict, its frequently shifting patterns over time, and the 
long-term consequences of conflict.  Notably they do not purport to explain where to draw 
the line in relation to future harm precisely because this is not a decisive factor.  Rather, they 
state that decision-makers should look at the trajectory of harm (violence, in that context) in 
deciding whether it is ‘foreseeable’ that it will spread into an area where there is no sign of 
violence there at the time of the risk assessment.96  The focus of the assessment remains on 
foreseeability of harm, and the Guidelines suggest factors to guide that assessment. They 
highlight that even where mitigating measures might intervene (such as the implementation 
of peace and demobilization agreements), there may still be negative outcomes. In other 
words, the presence of ‘multiple’ possibilities, each of which involves speculation, does not 
foreclose the possibility that protection is warranted.  Rather, the flexibility and open-ended 
nature of the well-founded fear and real risk tests provides the necessary framework for 
decision-makers to assess protection claims.
Against this backdrop, we now turn to two contexts in which these issues have arisen, namely 
health deterioration and movement in the context of the adverse impacts of climate change.
Health deterioration
The context in which the question of imminence of harm has arisen most squarely to date 
concerns cases involving deterioration of health after removal. The most developed 
jurisprudence on this issue emanates from the ECtHR. Its case law spans decades but has not 
developed consistently.97 In the seminal decision of D v United Kingdom in 1997, the court 
held that the proposed removal of a citizen of St Kitts from the United Kingdom in the 
‘advanced states of a terminal and incurable illness’98 would amount to a violation of Article 
3 of the ECHR on the basis that:
The abrupt withdrawal of these facilities will entail the most dramatic consequences 
for him. It is not disputed that his removal will hasten his death. There is a serious 
danger that the conditions of adversity which await him in St Kitts will further reduce 
his already limited life expectancy and subject him to acute mental and physical 
suffering.99
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While imminence of harm was not an explicit consideration in that case, it was central 
(albeit implicit) in a subsequent decision in 2008, namely N v United Kingdom. There, the 
court rejected an analogous claim on the basis that:
the quality of the applicant’s life, and her life expectancy, would be affected if she 
were returned to Uganda. The applicant is not, however, at the present time critically 
ill. The rapidity of the deterioration which she would suffer and the extent to which 
she would be able to obtain access to medical treatment, support and care, including 
help from relatives, must involve a certain degree of speculation, particularly in view 
of the constantly evolving situation as regards the treatment of HIV and AIDS 
worldwide.100
This decision had the effect of precluding successful claims by applicants seeking to 
resist removal due to health-related issues.101 However, in the 2016 judgment of Paposhvili v 
Belgium, the ECtHR adopted a less rigid approach. In that case, the Grand Chamber accepted 
a longer timeframe for the risk assessment, noting that ‘the impact of removal on the person 
concerned must be assessed by comparing his or her state of health prior to removal and how 
it would evolve after transfer to the receiving State.’102 Nevertheless, the applicant must still 
be ‘seriously ill’ at the time of removal, and while 
not at imminent risk of dying, would [nevertheless] face a real risk, on account of the 
absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such 
treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her 
state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life 
expectancy.103 
This is reminiscent of the language employed by the CJEU in the 2014 Abdida decision in 
which the court referred to ‘the seriousness and irreparable nature of the harm that may be 
caused by the removal’, namely ‘a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his 
state of health’.104  More recently, the CJEU has considered this issue in some depth, citing 
the test adopted by the ECtHR in Paposhvili; namely, ‘a serious, rapid and irreversible 
decline in his state of health’.105  The CJEU concluded that in assessing the obligation of non-
100
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refoulement in article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, return 
is not permitted ‘where such removal would result in a real and demonstrable risk of 
significant and permanent deterioration in the state of health of the person concerned’.106  
The use of the word ‘deterioration’ by the CJEU appears to imply that an applicant’s medical 
condition need not be at a critical stage at the time of the decision. 
The concession in Paposhvili that a decision-maker must consider the evolving 
situation post-transfer is significant, although there is no precise framing of the outer limits of 
the relevant temporal period. However, it clearly allows for a longer-term assessment than the 
more limited test articulated in N v United Kingdom. This is certainly how Paposhvili has 
been understood by the English Court of Appeal, which recently affirmed that ‘it is clear’ that 
the case ‘relaxes the test for violation of Article 3 in the case of removal of a foreign national 
with a medical condition’, but that ‘it does so only to a very modest extent’.107  The Court of 
Appeal’s interpretation assumes that imminence is still a requirement; it has merely been 
extended from ‘imminence of death’108 as the criterion to ‘a real risk of a serious and rapid 
decline in … health resulting either in intense suffering (to the Article 3 standard) or death in 
the near future’.109 
The Paposhvili decision is consistent with an analogous 2015 decision of the UNHRC. There, 
Canada was found to be in violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR for deporting a mentally ill 
person to Jamaica, notwithstanding Canada’s arguments that the potential longer-term 
consequences of deportation were ‘mere conjecture’ and ‘mere speculation’ because it was 
‘just as likely’ that the situation would not be as dire as predicted.110  On the other hand, in a 
case where there was no evidence of the applicant’s health deteriorating on the available 
evidence at the time of the determination, yet arguably a longer-term risk of death in the 
DRC, UNCAT found this aspect of the claim inadmissible.111
In sum, the health context suggests that while the jurisprudence has become more 
open to the assessment of a claim within a longer timeframe, the notion of imminence, in the 
sense of timing, is still a present and limiting factor that influences the scope of States’ 
obligations to provide international protection.
Climate change
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The other key context in which the question of timing of harm arises concerns claims linked 
to the adverse impacts of climate change. While the jurisprudence is far less developed than 
in the health context, such claims are ripe for future litigation and therefore warrant analysis.
The most comprehensive consideration of the future impacts of climate change in the 
protection context has been undertaken by decision-makers in New Zealand.112  While the 
notion of ‘imminence’ has been invoked explicitly in such cases (based on the UNHRC cases 
on standing),113 the Tribunal has observed that ‘[i]mminence should not be understood as 
imposing a test which requires the risk to life be something which is, at least, likely to 
occur’.114  Rather, it is comparable to the well-founded fear test in refugee law, requiring ‘no 
more than sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds for believing the appellant 
would be in danger’.115  However, it is important to note that the Tribunal found that the 
forward-looking nature of the protection inquiry demands that disaster risk reduction and 
adaptation strategies be taken into account in assessing future risks.116 As subsequently 
expressed by a member of the tribunal in an extra curial capacity, the longer the future 
timeframe, the less predictive certainty there is and the more speculative the risk assessment 
becomes because of the potential for mitigation, adaptation, and other risk-reducing 
actions.117 Accordingly, in the cases considered to date, the climate change-related harms 
were assessed as being insufficiently ‘present’, or the applicants not ‘in danger’, in part due 
to the potential for intervening adaptive measures.118  This conclusion is debatable given that, 
as recognized in the UNHCR Guidelines related to armed conflict and violence, the 
possibility of multiple potential outcomes does not automatically overcome the need for 
international protection, particularly when the trajectory of harm is moving in a clear 
direction. 
In this regard, it is instructive to consider assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) of the likelihood of certain future climate change risks (which 
could affect displacement). The findings listed below are based on the IPCC’s evaluation of 
the underlying scientific evidence and the degree of expert agreement, the combination of 
which determines the level of ‘confidence’ ascribed (ranging from ‘very low’ to ‘very 
high’).119 The term ‘virtually certain’ (in the last bullet point) means that the probability is 
99–100 per cent.120 According to the IPCC:
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• Impacts from recent climate-related extremes, such as heat waves, droughts, floods, 
cyclones, and wildfires, show the significant vulnerability and exposure of many 
human systems to current climate variability (very high confidence).121
• It is very likely that heat waves will occur more often and last longer, and that extreme 
precipitation events will become more intense and frequent in many regions. The 
ocean will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level will rise.122
• Low-lying areas are at risk from sea-level rise, which will continue for centuries even 
if global mean temperature is stabilized (high confidence).123
• It is virtually certain that global mean sea-level rise will continue for many centuries 
beyond 2100 (the amount will depend on future emissions).124
• Over the course of the twenty-first century, climate change is expected to lead to 
increases in ill-health in many regions, especially in developing countries with low 
incomes (high confidence).125
• The negative impacts of climate change on crop yields, across a wide range of regions 
and crops, have been more common than positive impacts (high confidence).126
• Climate change is projected to increase risks in urban areas for people, assets, 
economies and ecosystems, including from heat stress, storms and extreme 
precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought, water 
scarcity, sea level rise and storm surges (very high confidence). ‘These risks are 
amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services or living in exposed 
areas.’127
The high degree of likelihood expressed in each finding above would certainly meet 
the well-founded fear threshold in refugee law.128 As discussed above in Part III, it is not 
disputed that a ‘well-founded fear’ of being persecuted can equate to a less than 50 per cent 
chance of harm (even as low as 10 per cent) if the risk is plausible and reasonable.129 
Speculation about what ‘might’ happen in the future is thus a central component of 
determining refugee status.130 However, decision-makers place limits on how pre-emptive 
flight must be to warrant protection, which differ depending on the particular individual’s 
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degree of likelihood of its happening’.131 The assessment of the intensity, severity, and nature 
of future harm, based on its foreseeability in light of the individual’s circumstances, is the 
crucial factor.132 
The IPCC has noted that ‘[t]ransformations in economic, social, technological and 
political decisions and actions can enhance adaptation and promote sustainable development 
(high confidence)’,133 and ‘[i]nnovation and investments in environmentally sound 
infrastructure and technologies can reduce GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions and enhance 
resilience to climate change (very high confidence).’134  However, in the context of a 
protection claim, the future mitigation/adaptation possibilities remain speculative and 
uncertain, and do not detract from the current trajectory of adverse climate change impacts.  
The competing possibilities thus need to be evaluated in light of the less demanding standard 
of proof applied in refugee and human rights law.
In conclusion, while the climate change context presents particular challenges, the 
assessment of an applicant’s need for international protection should rest on uniform 
principles of refugee and human rights law, albeit with sufficient flexibility to respond to 
different factual contexts.
The two examples discussed above highlight the difficulty of identifying a precise 
timeframe to assess potential future harm. Indeed, it is likely impossible and inappropriate to 
attempt to devise with any precision a timeframe that delimits the scope of inquiry. After all 
it is not clear why State responsibility for future human rights violations following removal 
should be limited to those occurring within an immediate or short-term period.   
V. Discussion: Does Imminence Have Any Place in International Protection?
As mentioned above, there is little discussion in the case law as to the rationale and 
justification for invoking an imminence assessment.  However, one notable issue that has 
emerged from a close reading of the case law for this article is that, although ‘well-founded 
fear’ has generally not been overlaid with the additional gloss of necessity, directness, or 
even foreseeability, these concepts are prevalent in the jurisprudence on ‘real risk’.
Indeed, it appears that it is the introduction of additional factors by some 
supranational courts and other international oversight bodies, such as ‘necessary and 
foreseeable’,135 which has sometimes resulted in an imminence-like assessment. Where 
courts invoke a foreseeability test alone, imminence does not appear to be relevant. But 
where the concept of necessity (or similar) is introduced, if the risk is not imminent then it 
seems difficult for decision-makers to conclude that a necessary consequence of removal is 
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The problem is that ‘necessary’ and ‘foreseeable’ are conceptually distinct, and it is 
not clear where the necessity test originated or what its principled basis could be. To take the 
jurisprudence of the UNHRC as an example, General Comment 31 sets out the basis for an 
implied non-refoulement obligation, stating that: 
Moreover, the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the 
Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control 
entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from 
their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk 
of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, 
either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the 
person may subsequently be removed. The relevant judicial and administrative 
authorities should be made aware of the need to ensure compliance with the Covenant 
obligations in such matters.137
There is no mention of ‘necessity’ in this context, yet from the 1990s onwards, the 
UNHRC has sometimes described the relevant test as whether, ‘as a necessary and 
foreseeable consequence of deportation’, there will be a violation.138 The jurisprudence is 
inconsistent, however, and our analysis has revealed that where foreseeability is the test, a 
claim is more likely to succeed.139 By contrast, when additional factors such as whether the 
harm would be a ‘necessary’ consequence of removal are introduced, the claim is more likely 
to be rejected.
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A good illustration of the issue is provided by Ng v Canada. That case concerned a 
man facing execution on return to the United States, and the UNHRC found that, with respect 
to the potential method of execution, the sending State could ‘reasonably foresee that Mr Ng, 
if sentenced to death, would be executed in a way that amounts to a violation’ of Article 7 of 
the ICCPR.140 This was so despite strong dissenting views which pointed to the reasons why 
the harm might not eventuate, including that the applicant had not yet been ‘tried, convicted 
or sentenced’.141 Had the test been one of certainty or necessity, then these factors would 
have dictated that the claim fail.142 However, as one of the dissenting members explained, 
foreseeability, not certainty, is key:
Although it is impossible to predict a future event, it must be understood that whether 
or not a person is a victim depends on whether that event is foreseeable - or, in other 
words, on whether, according to common sense, it may happen, in the absence of 
exceptional events that prevent it from occurring…143
A similar outcome can be seen where the ECtHR focused squarely on 
foreseeability.144 In the extradition case of Rustamov v Russia, the court stated that:
[R]equesting an applicant to produce ‘indisputable’ evidence of a risk of ill-treatment 
in the requesting country would be tantamount to asking him to prove the existence of 
a future event, which is impossible, and would place a clearly disproportionate burden 
on him. In this respect it further reiterates its constant case-law to the effect that what 
should be assessed in this type of case are the foreseeable consequences of sending 
the applicant to the receiving country.145
Further, where the UNCAT has ignored the language of ‘imminence’ that has 
sometimes been invoked by complainants,146 preferring instead to rely on whether a risk of 
harm is ‘real, foreseeable and personal’,147 the claim has been more likely to succeed.148   
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Indeed, as Wouters observes, although the UNCAT used the terms ‘foreseeable’ and 
‘necessary’ in the first individual case regarding Article 3 of the CAT,149 (thus requiring that 
the risk of torture be both a foreseeable and necessary consequence of the removal), it has 
never used the term ‘necessary’ again. In Haydin v Sweden, the UNCAT pointed out that ‘the 
requirement of necessity and predictability should be interpreted in the light of its general 
comment on the implementation of Article 3’—in other words, rejecting the notion that these 
concepts imposed any higher standard than ‘real risk’.150
If the evidence is strong, an event or occurrence can be foreseeable even if it is not 
likely to manifest in the short-term. A risk can be real notwithstanding the fact that its 
manifestation is some time away. Of course, foreseeability itself does not provide a template 
for a definable future period, since the ‘temporal limits embodied in the notion of reasonably 
foreseeable future are unclear’,151 but it is nonetheless fundamentally different from certainty, 
likelihood, or probability.
When factors such as necessity are introduced, then the longer the timeframe 
considered, the less likely it is that the long-term harm can be said to amount to a necessary 
consequence of removal. As such, if extraneous concepts are incorporated into the real risk 
test in human rights law, it may be less able to accommodate slower-onset forms of harm 
than the well-founded fear test in refugee law. In other words, the well-founded fear test may 
have a greater capacity and openness to accommodate longer-range harm than the more 
stringent real risk test applied in some of the jurisdictions considered in this article. In order 
to test this hypothesis, a comprehensive examination of the extent to which imminence has 
been introduced—explicitly or implicitly—into national refugee decision-making is ripe, and 
forms the next stage of our research project. 
V. CONCLUSION
This article provides the first analysis of the notion of imminence in international refugee and 
human rights law in assessing the scope of international protection. It examines how acute or 
‘real’ a risk of harm must be before supranational courts and international oversight bodies 
consider that international protection is warranted. The comprehensive analysis of cases from 
our selected jurisdictions suggests that the notion of imminence has been introduced into the 
case law—sometimes explicitly, but most commonly only implicitly. Its application is 
inconsistent, problematic, and difficult to justify by reference to standard principles of 
refugee and human rights law. Given that a number of contemporary threats are more likely 
to raise these issues than ever before, further analysis is warranted, including a 
comprehensive examination of domestic jurisprudence. 
While this article represents the first output of a larger project, some interim conclusions can 
be drawn. The role of time as a factor in risk assessment in refugee law and international 
protection more broadly is radically underdeveloped, both in the jurisprudence and the 
scholarship. To be clear, we do not believe that the notion of imminence should be used to 
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limit international protection in any way: it should not. However, the point in time at which 
an event may occur is a contextual factor in assessing risk because it can affect how likely 
something is to occur.  In other words, if a threat is likely to manifest very soon, it may be 
easier for an individual to argue that he or she faces a real chance of being harmed, since 
there may be less opportunity for mitigating factors to intervene. By contrast, a threat in the 
more distant future might be able to be allayed or diminished through intervening measures. 
Nevertheless, if the risk of harm is distant but very real—for instance, the death penalty has 
been imposed on a person but it may be years before it is carried out—then protection may be 
required. The core question in each case is whether the risk is sufficiently real to meet the 
well-founded fear or real risk tests; any further gloss is a distraction.152 Our critique is that 
because the role and significance of time is simply not acknowledged by most decision-
makers, there is the potential for imminence to creep erroneously into substantive 
assessments, as has been seen in the examination of jurisprudence above. In our view, both 
the well-founded fear and real risk tests are sufficiently open-ended for decision-makers to be 
guided by these alone; they do not foreclose a risk of harm simply because it may eventuate 
further into the future.
It is indisputable that a protection-limiting criterion should not infiltrate decision-making 
without an explicit consideration of its legal validity and purpose. It is our hope that this 
initial attempt to parse out the relevant issues in this context will mark the first of many 
serious analyses. 
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